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REFLECTIONS ON THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY
Irving Younger*
The rule against hearsay has a peculiar shape. Four words
long as Federal Evidence Rule 802 puts it, "hearsay is not ad-
missible," it proceeds immediately to that fearsome preposi-
tional phrase, "with exceptions.... " And the exceptions, in the
formulation of Federal Evidence Rules 803 and 804, run to some
2,500 words.1 If the rule were stretched from where we sit to the
football stadium, the exceptions would reach Miami.2
This parlous state of affairs is similar to astronomy's before
Copernicus. Ptolemy set a motionless earth in the center and,
calculating from there, accounted for the observed positions of
the heavenly bodies, though by an elaboration of cycles, epicy-
cles, deferents, and equants quite enough to drive a man mad.
When Copernicus proclaimed the sun immobile with the planets
revolving around it, he wrought an exquisite simplicity. Every
thinker knows that as a proof, a proposition, a theory becomes
complicated, the less the chance that it is true; and if "truth" be
too chimerical a measure, then the less its elegance, the more
muted the mental pleasure it furnishes.3
Imagine, if you please, that we display to a practitioner of
one of the "exact" or "rigorous" branches of knowledge our
cherished rule against hearsay with all its exceptions piled up
* A.B., Harvard, 1953; LL.B., New York University, 1958; Samuel S. Leibowitz Pro-
fessor of Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School. This is the text of a lecture prepared
for delivery on the occasion of the celebration of Law Day at the School of Law of the
University of South Carolina on March 21, 1980.
1. Nor are the Federal Evidence Rules unique. Compare CAL. EvID. CoDE §§ 1200-
1205 (West 1966)(rule against hearsay and general provisions, 50 lines of type), with id.
(exceptions to the rule against hearsay, 429 lines of type). See also E. FisCH, NEW YORK
EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1977)(pages 446-56 dealing with the rule, pages 457-589 with the
exceptions).
2. These words were intended to be spoken at the University of South Carolina
School of Law Auditorium in Columbia, South Carolina.
3. This principle of parsimony, also known as "Ockham's razor," was frequently
used in philosophical proofs at least as early as William of Ockham (1285-1349). See 8
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHMOSOPHY 307 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
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behind it and that we inquire of him, as a friendly but intelli-
gent stranger to the law, what he makes of it.
"Redo your experiments," he responds.
"Lawyers don't do experiments," quoth we.
"Then redo your theory," he remarks, "and cease troubling
me with the needless mystifications of a jejune discipline."
Our friend's impatience brings it home to us that the struc-
ture of hearsay theory has taken on a shape ungainly and ill-
proportioned. This lack of comeliness suggests something amiss
with the method by which we lawyers have elaborated our most
famous rule of evidence. Since things ought not to be left so
sadly out of joint, let me try to bemuse the leaden-footed min-
utes you have allotted me by attempting a more satisfactory ex-
pression of the rule against hearsay.
We were taught in law school that cross-examination is the
central feature of a common-law trial. Deprive the adversary of
cross-examination, and the evidence will not be received against
him. The name we attach to this sort of evidence which is inad-
missible for no other reason than the lack of opportunity to
cross-examine, is hearsay; and the rule against hearsay is a way
of giving effect to the judgment that, unless it can be cross-ex-
amined, evidence ought not to be admitted. The vice of hearsay,
in a word, is the lack of opportunity to cross-examine. That is
why we define hearsay in terms of cross-examination. Hearsay is
evidence that depends for its probative value upon the credibil-
ity of someone who cannot be cross-examined.4 Or, in somewhat
shorter form, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.'
I claim, however, that cross-examination or its absence is a
ring around the target, not the bull's-eye. I suggest that what
the law gives the adversary is protection, not against uncross-
examined evidence, but against unreliable evidence. Although
the principal assurance of reliability is cross-examination, it is
not the sole assurance. When we point to cross-examination as
the basis of the rule against hearsay, therefore, we are a few de-
grees off center. It is to reliability we should look.
"Perhaps," I hear you say, "but we're not putting our
money on a mere assertion. It's demonstration we want."
4. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 111-12 (1842).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
[Vol. 32
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I acknowledge your demand and report that, seeking to sat-
isfy you, I turned to two sources. I went first to the library, and
then to the computer. In the library, I found three lines of cases
to support my idea that the rule against hearsay is really a rule
against unreliable evidence. The first line of cases consists in
battle-pieces, large canvases on which can be observed heroic
judges seizing the monster hearsay by its scaly neck and hacking
it to pieces.
For example, in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur-
ance Co.,' the tower of the Dallas County Courthouse in Selma,
Alabama, collapsed. Since the insurance covered loss due to
lightning, thAt is what the county claimed to have caused the
catastrophe, adducing some charred timbers for proof. The de-
fendants sought to avoid coverage by disputing the cause: the
charred timbers, they asserted, were remnants of a fire that had
occurred in 1901. To support their contention, the defendants
offered a copy of the Selma Morning Times for June 9, 1901,
describing the fire. The county's objection was overruled, and
the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict in defendants' favor
as follows:
There is no procedural canon against the exercise of com-
mon sense in deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. In
1901 Selma, Alabama, was a small town. Taking a common
sense view of this case, it is inconceivable to us that a newspa-
per reporter in a small town would report there was a fire in
the dome of the new courthouse-if there had been no fire. He
is without motive to falsify, and a false report would have sub-
jected the newspaper and him to embarrassment in the com-
munity. The usual dangers inherent in hearsay evidence, such
as lack of memory, faulty narration, intent to influence the
court proceedings, and plain lack of truthfulness are not pre-
sent here. To our minds, the article published in the Selma
Morning Times on the day of the fire is more reliable, more
trustworthy, more competent evidence than the testimony of a
witness called to the stand fifty-eight years later.
... We do not characterize this newspaper as a "business
record," nor as an "ancient document," nor as any other read-
ily identifiable and happily tagged species of hearsay excep-
tion. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy,
6. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
1980]
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relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hearing within rea-
sonable bounds.
7
In State v. Gause,8 the defendant appealed his conviction
for murdering his wife. The trial judge had admitted the victim's
will, which contained expressions of fear that her husband would
kill her, as well as evidence of oral statements to the same effect.
After reviewing the precedents characterizing such declarations
as non-hearsay so long as the victim's state of mind is in issue9
but as hearsay when it is not, the court said:
We fail to apprehend some of the nice distinctions with
which the courts play in applying the hearsay rule.
We note that in the cases on this and related points the
courts often resort to strained logic to attain the desired result.
In determining the identity of the person committing a mur-
der, the fact that the victim had reason to fear the defendant
has some probative value. The indicia of reliability of the hear-
say statements are as certainly present on the question of iden-
tity as they are on the issue of accident or suicide. We fail also
to grasp the attempted distinction regarding when the state of
mind of the victim is or is not in issue. We are not impressed
with pious instructions to the jury which tell them to consider
the statements of the victim only for the purpose of determin-
ing the victim's state of mind.
Courts have tended to permit hearsay to be introduced in
evidence when, for some reason or other, such evidence has a
special reliability .... In examining the evidence objected to
here, we find that although it does not completely fit into any
of the well recognized categories of exceptions to the hearsay
rule, it does have a special reliability.
Let us meet the problem head-on, brush aside the sophis-
try, and say that when expressions of fear by a murder victim,
though they may be hearsay, are relevant, have probative value
on the issue of identity, and when in human experience they
have sufficient reliability, they should be admitted in
7. Id. at 397-98.
8. 107 Ariz. 491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971).
9. The victim's state of mind would have been in issue had the defendant raised a
claim of suicide or self-defense, which he did not.
284 [Vol. 32
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These are not the only examples,11 but they suffice to ex-
hibit the victory of "reliability" over "hearsay." The second kind
of case is a domestic interior wherein a competent and efficient
judge goes about the homely business of deciding an apparently
everyday hearsay point, but with just enough decolletage to per-
mit us to make out the real basis of the receipt or exclusion of
hearsay, and, lo, it is reliability.
In Vincent v. Thompson,1 2 the question was whether Dr.
Thompson had administered a certain drug to plaintiffs' daugh-
ter. When plaintiffs testified that Dr. Thompson admitted it, the
drug manufacturer objected on the ground of hearsay. The court
quoted from an earlier case as follows:
"The common law of evidence is constantly being refash-
ioned by the courts of this and other jurisdictions to meet the
demands of modern litigation. Exceptions to the hearsay rules
are being broadened and created where necessary... Absent
some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the
Legislature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to further,
not frustrate, the truth-finding function of the courts in civil
cases."13
Applying these considerations to Vincent, the court held the
hearsay to be admissible: "Under the circumstances, the only
way the hearsay evidence could be deemed inadmissible against
Parke, Davis would be by a rigid and slavish adherence to a
black-letter rule. We should not thus elevate form over sub-
stance in disregard of the requirements of justice. 1 4
Having come this far, let me give .voice to an objection many
of you doubtless might raise were you inclined to be uncivil.
10. 107 Ariz. at 494-95, 489 P.2d at 833-34 (citation omitted).
11. Others are Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Hew v. Aruda, 51
Hawaii 451, 462 P.2d 476 (1969); Woll v. Dugas, 104 N.J. Super. 586, 250 A.2d 775
(1969). In Massachusetts, "a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible
in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the case
may be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowl-
edge of the declarant." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1959).
12. 50 A.D.2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975).
13. Id. at 225, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (quoting Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 341,
200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1964)).
14. Id. at 225, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (citations omitted).
1980]
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Granted, you would say, reliability figures significantly in these
cases, perhaps even to the supersession of cross-examination.
But what difference does it make? Suppose courts continued to
use the old categories, making sidelong references to reliability
from time to time. Would we be any the poorer? My answer: I
do not know whether we would be poorer. I do know that a
forthright recognition of the bases of decision, in plain English,
calling things by their right name, would contribute something,
perhaps much, to the coherence of the law and its maturation as
a genuinely intellectual calling.
To illustrate my point, I remind you of Palmer v. Hoff-
man.15 There, supporting its defense to a claim of negligence,
the railroad offered its engineer's report. Hearsay, argued the
railroad, but admissible as a business record. The Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit the report be-
cause, it said, the report was "not a record made for the system-
atic conduct of the business as a business."1
Now pair with Palmer v. Hoffman a decision of the Appel-
late Division in New York, Matter of Ronald B.17 The subject of
the appeal was an adjudication of juvenile delinquency on ac-
count of the juvenile's possession of an operable handgun. After
arresting the juvenile and finding the gun, the police had sent it
to the ballistics laboratory for testing. The laboratory report was
offered as a business record; the juvenile objected on the author-
ity of Palmer v. Hoffman; and the court held the report admissi-
ble because it "does further the business of the police
department." '18
Instead of balderdash about an accident report not part of
the railroad's business while a ballistics report is part of the po-
lice department's business, would it not be 'more satisfactory to
face up to the obvious? The report in Palmer v. Hoffman was
inadmissible because the court did not trust it. The report in
Matter of Ronald B. was admissible because the court did trust
it. Railroad engineers involved in accidents may lie. Ballistics
15. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
16. Id. at 113.
17. 61 A.D.2d 204, 401 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1978).
18. Id. at 208, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 547. The court referred to reliability, but in connec-
tion with the general acceptance that suffices to excuse what would otherwise be the
requirement of expert testimony about the scientific basis of a technical device. This has
nothing to do with the point at issue in Ronald B.
[Vol. 32
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tests do not. This is the reading of Palmer v. Hoffman we are
given in Federal Evidence Rule 803(6).' 9 It is heard as a kind of
echo in Matter of Ronald B. But were the echo sounded forte
and in C major, were the court in a case like Palmer v. Hoffman
or Matter of Ronald B. to say the record is admissible because it
is reliable and for no other reason, the tears of pride would run
down my cheeks, and I suspect yours too.
Before leaving this second kind of case, there is a last point
to be made, requiring recitation of yet another example. In Pot-
ter v. Baker,20 the plaintiff claimed to have been struck at an
intersection by defendant's car. On the issue of defendant's neg-
ligence, plaintiff offered to testify that, when she came to, some
moments after the impact, she heard a pedestrian exclaim to an-
other, "God, he [defendant] rushed the light." The trial judge
sustained defendant's objection on the ground the hearsay was
unreliable. The intermediate appellate court reversed on the
ground the hearsay was admissible as an excited utterance, and
the supreme court reversed again, affirming the trial judge's rul-
ing. In such matters, the appellate court must not substitute its
judgment for the trial court's. If the latter's ruling is reasonable,
it will be affirmed.2 1
Observe what Potter adds to the discussion. It places on the
judge the responsibility to determine, at the threshhold and as a
matter of sound discretion, whether the evidence is reliable
enough to be admitted. If the judge decides that it is unreliable
as he did in Potter, he excludes the evidence. If he decides oth-
erwise, he admits it. What follows from this? You shall see, la-
dies and gentlemen, you shall see.
19. Under Federal Evidence Rule 803(6), the following is not excluded by the hear-
say rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. RULE EVID. 803(6).
20. 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955).
21. Id. at 500, 124 N.E.2d at 146-47.
1980]
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My third line of cases is the line, chiefly in the United
States Supreme Court, construing the sixth amendment right of
confrontation. There is an enormous number of things to say
about these cases. Here, my purpose is simply to sketch out a
preliminary view of the way in which they are affecting the law
of hearsay.
The sixth amendment right of confrontation is a guarantee
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 22 In
1965, the Supreme Court set out to develop a definition of con-
frontation, devoting roughly one case per term for five years to
various aspects of the problem.23 But a review of those cases is
not to the point.24 What is, rather, is that today the right of con-
frontation is separated into two branches. In one, the right of
confrontation assures that the defendant's cross-examination of
persons who take the stand against him will have the broadest
possible scope.25 The other branch tries to answer the question
when the right of confrontation permits or forbids hearsay to be
received against the defendant. California v. Green26 held that,
so long as the defendant can cross-examine the hearsay declar-
ant, either at the time of utterance or at trial, the right of con-
frontation does not bar receipt of the hearsay. In Dutton v. Ev-
ans,27 however, it seems that the Court changed its mind.
Dutton teaches that the test of confrontation is reliability. Put-
ting it less opaquely, when hearsay is offered against the defen-
dant in a criminal case, an objection under the confrontation
clause will be overruled if the hearsay is reliable.28
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
24. Such a review may be found in Younger, Hearsay and Confrontation, 2 NAT. J.
CRiM. DEF. 65 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66
(Alaska 1976); People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 325 N.E.2d 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d £12
(1975); State v. Jalo, 27 Oreg. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976). This branch of the right of
confrontation does not bear upon the subject of this lecture.
26. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
27. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In Dutton, no single opinion had the support of a majority of
the Justices. The comments that follow in the text are addressed to Justice Stewart's
plurality opinion.
28. Id. at 89-90. After summarizing the relevant circumstances surrounding the
hearsay, Justice Stewart stated:
[Vol. 32
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Whether one follows California v. Green or Dutton v. Ev-
ans, the method of analysis remains the same. When the prose-
cutor tenders hearsay, there are two objections to be considered.
First, the hearsay objection, resolved by application of the juris-
diction's law of hearsay. If the objection is sustained, the prose-
cutor goes to something else. If the objection is overruled, de-
fense counsel proceeds to the second objection, violation of the
right of confrontation. That objection is determined by reference
to the Supreme Court's attempts to say what confrontation iS.
29
The two objections must be treated separately because they rest
upon wholly different doctrinal foundations, as both Justice
White for the majority in Greens° and Justice Stewart for the
plurality in Evans 1 were at pains to say.
Now, as I read the recent cases on this second branch of the
right of confrontation, a subtle pattern has begun to emerge.
The courts are tending no longer to apply the two-step approach
of Green and Evans. Instead, judges are inclining to reduce the
two steps to one, something along these lines: Is the hearsay reli-
able enough to be admissible under the confrontation clause? If
it is, ipso facto, it is admissible despite the rule against hearsay.
In a metaphor, the confrontation clause has become a door.
When the door is open, hearsay is admitted. When the door is
closed, hearsay is excluded. The door is open when the hearsay
is reliable. The test of the admissibility of hearsay therefore, is
its reliability.
In United States v. Medico,3 2 the first of three illustrations
of this pattern I propose to lay before you, the defendant was
convicted of bank robbery. He owned a car with a certain license
number. A bank teller was permitted to testify that that very
These circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams [the hearsay declar-
ant] had no apparent reason to lie to Shaw [the prosecution witness]. His
statement was spontaneous, and it was against his penal interest to make it.
These are indicia of reliablity which have been widely viewed as determinative
of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no con-
frontation of the declarant.
Id. at 89 (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.).
29. That is, the trial judge must decide whether the law is California v. Green, Dut-
ton v. Evans, or something else. See, e.g., United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1102-05
(2d Cir. 1973); State v. Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 484 P.2d 368, 369-72 (1971).
30. 399 U.S. at 155-56.
31. 400 U.S. at 86-87.
32. 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977).
1980]
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license number was given the teller by a customer who received
it from a passerby as the license number of the get-away vehicle.
Affirming, the court remarked in text that "several factors con-
tribute to the reliability of [the teller's] testimony,"33 and in a
footnote stated: "The Sixth Amendment guarantee of confronta-
tion, therefore, should not blind us to the reality that the ques-
tion of the admission of the hearsay statements, whether in a
criminal or civil case, turns on due process considerations of
fairness, reliability and trustworthiness." 34
In United States v. West,3 5 the grand-jury testimony of one
Brown had been admitted against the defendant after Brown's
murder. Affirming the conviction, the court said:
Whether the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
of Brown's grand jury testimony are equivalent to those which
arise from cross or direct examination... we need not deter-
mine. In this unusual case, those guarantees were probably
greater.
It should not be surprising that the same circumstances
suffice to meet the requirements of [Rule] 804(b)(5) [of the
Federal Evidence Rules] and of the Confrontation Clause. 6
Finally, in United States v. Oates,37 we have a case in which
the confrontation door was closed. At trial, the judge overruled
defendant's objection to the receipt of two documents purport-
ing to be the official report and worksheet of the chemist who
analyzed as heroin the substance seized from the defendant. On
appeal, the government argued that the report was admissible
under Federal Evidence Rules 803(6) ("records of regularly con-
ducted activity"), 803(8) ("public records and reports"), and
803(24) ("other exceptions"). Other evidence casts considerable
doubt upon the reliability of the report. The court of appeals
reversed:
We thus consider it clear that Congress has expressed a
firm intention that, if there are plausible doubts that evidence
fitting within the literal terms of a hearsay exception could sur-
33. Id. at 315.
34. Id. at 314, n.4.
35. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
36, Id. at 1136, 1138.
37. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
290 [Vol. 32
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vive confrontation analysis, the hearsay exception should be
construed with considerable flexibility so that the court can, if
possible, avoid deciding the constitutional question.3s
Which is as much as to say that receipt or exclusion of hearsay
under the rule against hearsay will be determined by deciding
whether it is admissible or inadmissible under the confrontation
clause, which in turn is as much as to say that the receipt of
hearsay depends upon its reliability.
There is my account of what I found in the library. Come
with me now to the computer room and gaze upon the console.
You must understand that were I to lay a finger upon that con-
sole, I would instantly short out the computer, the university,
and probably the Strategic Air Command. Consequently, I did
not lay a finger upon the console. I prevailed upon Daniel Cohn,
of the Massachusetts Bar, then a third-year law student at Cor-
nell, to devise and run a LEXIS program to suit my purpose.
The program had a presupposition, and I had better reveal
it. I believe that lawyers and judges usually sense the inadequa-
cies of legal theory and, though they may be unable or unwilling
to put it into words, act upon their impression by ignoring the
theory. I believe too that when lawyers and judges ignore the
theory, it is too bad for the theory, not for the lawyers and
judges. It is time then to change the theory.
If I am right that the rule against hearsay is not a rule
against uncross-examined evidence but rather is a rule against
unreliable evidence, it would comport with the beliefs I have just
stated to you to conclude that lawyers and judges act accord-
ingly: that is, hearsay is received when it is reliable, without re-
gard to doctrinal niceties. And since trial lawyers are rational
men and women, able for themselves to determine what is relia-
ble and reluctant to offer evidence only to see it excluded, does
it not follow that reliable hearsay will be offered most of the
time and that most of the time hearsay will in fact be admitted?
That is what I used the computer to try to find out. In how
many cases is hearsay admitted, without regard to the nature of
the analysis undergirding the decision?
Here are the results: 9
38. Id. at 79.
39. Mr. Cohn's description of his method is as follows:
19801
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Sampling of federal











number of % number of % number of %
cases cases cases
Hearsay ad- 771 401I 411
mitted 82% 81% 56%
Harmless error 21 6) 6)
to admit
hearsay
Hearsay ex- 22 18% 11 19% 37 44%
cluded
Sampling of Sampling of Sampling of
Georgia Supreme Illinois Su- Missouri Su-
Court preme Court preme Court
1973-77 1960-77 1973-77
number of % number of % number of %
cases cases cases
Hearsay ad- 50 27) 26
mitted 78% 67% 76%
Harmless error 9) 5 9
to admit
hearsay
Hearsay ex- 17 22% 16 33% 11 24%
cluded
I first tried a program that summoned all cases containing the word "hear-
say." Most of the cases thus summoned, however, dealt with sufficiency of evi-
dence and were thus irrelevant. I then asked LEXIS for all cases containing
the word "hearsay" and, within forty words of it, a word containing the letters
ADMI, INADMI, ALLOW, EXCLU, PERMI, or IMPERMI. LEXIS told me
how many cases fit that description. If the number was manageable (as in the
case of Arizona), I looked at all of them. In the other instances, I sampled the
cases at random. Between one-fourth and one-half of the cases summoned
turned out to concern problems other than the admissibility of hearsay at trial.
They were rejected, as were cases involving parole hearings or other adminis-
trative proceedings. Even in the instance of Arizona, this research probably did
not disclose all cases that considered hearsay problems. But that is unimpor-
tant. The crucial thing is that everything I did was neutral as between admit-
ting or excluding the hearsay evidence. The program was calculated to search
no harder for cases excluding the evidence than admitting it, and, when I chose
sample cases from among those summoned by the program I did so at random.
Thus I believe that the proportion of cases admitting the hearsay to those ex-
cluding it fairly represents the practice in each of the jurisdictions I surveyed.
[Vol. 32
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This first, tentative, incomplete, and flawed attempt to find
out by computer what actually happens in court when hearsay is
offered in evidence tends to confirm my hypothesis. There is no
rule against hearsay. Hearsay is usually admitted.40 The basis of
receiving it is its reliability. Thus, there is only a rule against
unreliable evidence. If and when everyone agrees, we will rewrite
our statutes or reformulate the common law something like this:
"Hearsay is admissible .... "
But since, when I talked about Potter v. Baker some while ago
41
I promised that you would see what follows from it, let me con-
tinue my draft in this manner:
".. . unless the court decides as a preliminary question that
the hearsay could not reasonably be accepted by the finder of
fact as trustworthy. The finder of fact remains free to disbe-
lieve admitted hearsay."
Having given the world this proposed new rule, I know three
things to a certainty. First, I know that it will be attacked as
novel. But surely it is not for that reason wrong. Second, I know
that it will be attacked on the ground that under it, rulings on
hearsay will be unpredictable. But no less predictable, I should
think, than under the present hodgepodge. Third, I know that it
will be attacked on the ground that it is unrealistic to think that
lawyers and judges can be as straightforward as adoption of the
new rule would require. There, alas, I have no defense.'2
Letter from Mr. Cohn to South Carolina Law Review (August, 1980), on file with South
Carolina Law Review.
40. Even in New York, where the percentage of cases excluding hearsay is highest,
hearsay is admitted more than half the time.
41. See text following note 20 supra.
42. But then again, perhaps I do. The Bench and Bar of England have accepted
reform of the rule against hearsay similar to the one proposed here. See The Civil Evi-
dence Act, 16 & 17 Eliz. 2, c. 64 (1968); LAw REFORM COMMITTEE, THIRTEENTH REPORT,
CMD No. 2964, at 9-10 (1966); CRIMINAL LAW REVISION CoamTTE, ELEVENTH REPORT,
CMD No. 4991, at 137-39 (1972).
19801
13
Younger: Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss2/2
